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CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DEEP 
SEABED MINING 
L.F .E. Goldie* 
I am to speak today on Customary International Law and Deep 
Seabed Mining.1 At the outset, perhaps a point should be made 
regarding the economic significance of the manganese nodules of the 
deep seabed. A number of congressional documents have been pro-
duced over the last decade purporting to present projections of the 
expected future world demand and supply of the minerals and ma-
terials to be found in those nodules. They predict either shortages 
of the supply of the relevant land-based minerals, or possibly unsta-
ble political conditions in the countries from whence they now come. 
They also predict that if the deep seabed mining of manganese 
nodules should come into commercial production, the effect would 
merely be one of stabilizing prices and preventing a sky-rocketing 
inflation of those prices which could, inevitably, threaten world 
stability. 
I intend in this paper to stress current issues and questions 
involving the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea and to look at their effects. 2 But first of all, let use review the 
* Professor of Law, Director of International Legal Studies Program, College of Law, 
Syracuse University. LL.B., University of Western Australia, LL.M., University of Sidney. 
1. Goldie, A General International Law Doctrine for Seabed Regimes, THE INT'L LAWYER 
796 (1973); Goldie, The General International Law Regime of the Deep Ocean Floor, 2 
BROOKLYN L. REV. (1975); Burton, Freedom of the Seas: International Law Applicable to Deep 
Seabed Mining Claims, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1135 (1977). 
2. For ten years the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, and sessions 
of United Nations General Assembly Committees in preparatory meetings therefor (beginning 
with the Ad Hoc UN Seabed Committee in the summer of 1968), have been working to 
produce a "Constitution for the Oceans." Many of the nations of the world (totalling some 
159, of which 149 are members of the United Nations) are represented. Thus we see a most 
complicated, radical and contentious lawmaking conference in which politics and economic 
considerations have consistently over-ridden the juridical. 
Some, but not all, of the Sessions have produced documents called "Negotiating Texts" 
with various prefixes. (These are: the Informal Single Negotiating Text, 1975 (Third Session), 
Parts I, II and III of this text appear at the Third United United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea Official Records, Vol. 9, 137, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8 (1975); Part IV of 
the text appears at UNCLOS III Official Records, Vol. 5 at p. 111, UN Doc. A/CONF.62;WP.9 
and Add.1; the Revised Single Negotiating Text, 1976, Fourth Session, appears as an UN-
CLOS III official document UN Doc.A/CONF.62/WP.8/Rev.1 (6May1976); and the Informal 
Composite Negotiating Text, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10 (15 July 1975). In addition to the 
foregoing, the United Nations Secretariat prepared, following the First (Caracas) Session, a 
"Main Trend" paper, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2;WP.1. Despite its UN document number this 
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primordial principles of the customary international law of the sea 
as it has come to us from the days of Grotius-the 17th century. As 
we know, the advocates of the freedom of the seas (who triumphed) 
saw the high seas as common property. As with all common property 
such as a village well where each villager can draw his individual 
needs in the form of water from the well, or a common field where 
he can pasture his animals, the governing ideology prescribed that 
no state could enclose any part of the common sea. On the other 
hand, individuals were permitted to take resources of the sea which 
they could reduce to possession.3 This is reflected in Grotius' famous 
quotation from Plautus. "[W]hen the slave says: 'The sea is cer-
tainly common to all persons' the fisherman agrees; but when the 
slave adds: 'Then what is found in the common sea is common 
property,' he rightly objects saying: 'But what my net and hooks 
have taken is absolutely my own.' " 4 
3. Under the right of capture-which requires that the person claiming ownership must 
have reduced the object to his physical possession and control-it could be argued that an 
ocean miner's only claim to have legal possession and title to nodules when he has reduced 
them to his exclusive physical custody and control, i.e., only when he has caught them in his 
gathering equipment. This is an unnecessarily restrictive view. Nor is it relevant to the 
exigencies of the mining of manganese nodules from the ocean floor since its main ocean law 
provenance has been in terms of fin fisheries. This restrictive view has not been applied in 
other fisheries in which the practicalities and the need for public order have dictated a 
recognition of symbolic, without actual possession-for example the special whale fishery 
customs of Greenland and Galapagos. Moreover, there must be recognition of the equities of 
those who have invested time, effort and capital in their searches for hunting or preparations 
for the final apprehension of the target resource. See 0 . HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 212 (35th 
printing 1943). In the context of deep ocean mining, the taking of the first nodule from the 
claimed ore body in an equitably acceptable and determinate area, should be deemed to 
establish possession over all the nodules within that area. The taking of the first sample 
nodule should be viewed as a symbolic taking of possession of all the nodules which it 
represents as a sample, since the enterprise has, from that moment on, a clear intention of 
taking all the others in the claimed area, plus the technological power to reduce them to its 
physical control by means of the knowledge it gains from the sample, and the procedures of 
collection and processing which that sample calls for. 
4. H. GROTIUS, FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 29 (Magoffin trans. 1916). 
The problem of proprietorship of goods taken from or subject to dominion in the com-
mons is one of considerable complexity. The preliminary step is to distinguish the property, 
private law concept of moninion (dominium) from the public law one of imperium. Tradition-
ally, international law has recognized the acquisition of private rights (e.g., ownership or 
dominium) over unowned res nullui and feral natural. Thus, for example Grotius recognized 
that while the high seas are common to all nations and cannot be appropriated by anyone or 
any nation, the wealth they contain can become the object of private proprietorship. 
Grotius also pointed out that neither states nor individuals may assert dominion over 
the air and sea which are "common," or "public," but that wild animals, fish and birds may 
be reduced to possession "[f]or if nay one seizes those things and assumes possession of 
them, they can become the objects of private ownership." Id. 
lmperium, or sovereignty, on the other hand relates to the public, or sovereign aspects 
2
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The argument that supported the advice Mr. Ely and I gave 
Deepsea Ventures5 several years ago was based on this hypothesis: 
namely, that the fisherman owns his fish. The manganese nodules 
which the H.M.S. Challenger took from the deep seabed over a 
hundred years ago in her scientific expedition were always held to 
belong to the British Government. What the H.M.S. Challenger did 
was to take goods from the common which, by reducing them to 
possession, became the property of the owner of the H.M.S. Chal-
lenger. But the governing rule of property, which I suggested in that 
notice, was not simply a possessory title to goods which had been 
apprehended. There is a very interesting piece of history which I 
looked into in as much detail as possible at the National Archives 
some years ago. An American citizen, a Mr. Longyear, established 
a coal mine on the Island of Spitsbergen. Not only was there an 
enterprising Yankee from Boston, but also a couple of Scots, a Nor-
wegian, a Russian and later on a German, all digging for coal on 
Spitsbergen. The big difference between our Boston Yankee and the 
Europeans was that the Europeans sent their coal home, but our 
enterprising Yankee sold his coal to the highest bidder on the coal 
market in Europe.6 
of acqusition, not the ownership or dominium, rights. Imperium is thus a jurisdictional, 
rather than a proprietary, concept of international law. 
5. In 1974 I participated in the drafting of, and signed, together with Northcutt Ely, 
Esq., as counsel, a Notice of Discovery and Claim of Exclusive Rights, and Request for 
Diplomatic Protection and Protection of Investment, by Deepsea Ventures Inc., dated Nov-
ember 14, 1974. This document, which was addressed to the Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, 
then the United States Secretary of State, stated, inter alia that: 
Deepsea has been advised by Counsel, whose names appear at the end hereof, 
that it has validly established the exclusive rights asserted in this Claim under 
existing international law as evidenced by the practice of States, the 1958 Convention 
on the High Seas, and general rules of law recognized by civilized nations. 
Deepsea asserts the exclusive rights to develop, evaluate and mine the Deposit 
and to take, use, and sell all of the manganese nodules in and the minerals and metals 
derived therefrom. It is proceeding with appropriate diligence to do so, and requests 
and requires States, persons and all other commercial or political entities to respect 
the exclusive rights asserted herein. Deepsea does not assert, or ask the United States 
of America to assert a territorial claim to the seabed or subsoil underlying the De-
posit. Use of the underlying water column, as a freedom of the high seas, will be made 
to the extent necessary to recover and transport the manganese nodules of the De-
posit. 
14 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS. 51 (filed Nov. 15, 1974) (1975); See also Goldie, Mining Rights and 
the General International Law Regime of the Deep Ocean Floor, 2 BROOKLYN J. INT'L 21, at 
49 (1975). 
6. In 1973 I published a study of what I perceived to have been, at that time, the received 
and established principles, reflected both in the fascinating legal institutions developed gov-
erning mining claims on Spitsbergen when the island group had the legal status of terra nullis 
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One very interesting fact was established in Spitsbergen. This 
archipelago had been discovered very late in the 16th century by the 
British or very early in the 17th century by the Dutch. When King 
James became king of England as well as Scotland he called Spits-
bergen "King James' New Found Land." The Dutch, however, con-
tested his ownership. The rivalry between the British and the Dutch 
arose out of sealing and whaling-hunting for the furs and oil. Sub-
sequently, the Russians and the City of Bremen developed claims. 
The claims of the latter were taken up by the German Empire in 
the 19th century when that state became a successor to the free 
city of Bremen. In addition to those countries, claims of territorial 
sovereignty over Spitsbergen were pressed by the Danes and, after 
their independence in 1905, the Norwegians. By the late 19th cen-
tury, when a number of miners were digging for coal on Spitsbergen, 
the territory had been known for 300 years, and nobody had success-
fully exercised any undisputed sovereignty over it. But what all the 
people used to do in this masterless territory, including Mr. Lon-
gyear, our American precedent, was this: they would mark out an 
area and stake out a mining claim, which they would call a tract. 
They would then file their claim to their tract with the foreign office 
of their country.7 Everyone did it. Thus it became a common prac-
tice that "miners' rights" could be established in no man's land-
that is, exclusive rights to mine established "tracts." 
Then, the next step is even more interesting. After Norway got 
her independence from Sweden, Norway wished to revive the an-
cient claim of the Viking Kings to all the islands in the North 
Atlantic including Spitsbergen. And so, they started to call confer-
ences to decide the future of the Archipelago. In 1909 President Taft 
told the Congress that the United States was not interested in estab-
("masterless land") and what appeared to me to be the confirming evidence of the practice 
of "miner's right" as "a general principle of law recognized by civilized nations"-a contem-
porary equivalent of the pragmatically perceived jus gentuim underlying the Edictum 
Perpetuum of the classical Roman Praetor Peregrinus. See Goldie, A General International 
Law Doctrine for Seabed Regimes, 7 THE INT'L LAWYER 796 (1973). 
7. The question of titles to land is most important. So far the practice has been 
for a mining company, on taking land, to erect notices to the effect, and to notify 
their own Foreign Office, where the claim is registered, if no previous claim invalida-
tes it. This notification constitutes the real title-deed, and the British Foreign Office 
several years ago promised British mining companies that their claims would be 
safeguarded. All land titles of the two British companies named above are perfectly 
valid and beyond dispute. The same is true of the Norwegian, Swedish and Russian 
estates. But Spitsbergen has already attracted adventurers, and complications are 
bound to ensue owing to attempts to jump claims. 
Shepstone, Coal and Iron from the Arctic, 121 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 362 at 376 (Oct. 11, 1919). 
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lishing any territorial claims on Spitsberen, but expressed the deter-
mination to attend the Conference so as to protect rights "already 
vested" of American citizens to mining tracts in the area. He did 
this in a State of the Union Address to Congress in 1909.8 The 
position which this speech reflected has been criticized on the 
ground that to talk of property rights which have become vested in 
a territory which has no sovereign is wrong, indeed impossible. 11 
This just shows how strongly the ghost, or rather the juridical 
theory, of John Austin and the 19th century positivists still haunts 
us. As one who sides with President (and later Chief Justice) Taft, 
I feel the opposing view is simply an unquestioning acceptance of a 
positivistic theory of law. 10 It is true that in the freshman property 
books we tend to be told that "property" is something that the law 
of the state says is "property"-rather like Humpty Dumpty's fa-
8. The Department of State, in view of proofs filed with it in 1906, showing 
American possession, occupation and working of certain coal-bearing lands in Spits-
bergen, accepted the invitation under the reservation above stated [i.e., the question 
of altering the status of the islands as countries belonging to no particular state and 
as equally open to the citizens and subjects of all states should not be raised] and 
under the further reservation that all interests in those islands already vested should 
be protected and that there should be equality of opportunity for the future. 
Annual Message of the President to Congress, Dec. 7, 1909, (1909) For Rels. U.S. IX, at XIII 
(1914 ed.) 
9. In these circumstances a real right, in the common acceptance of the term, 
cannot exist in Spitsbergen. Restriction upon the use and occupancy of land [there] 
must depend not on the government's having control over the land used or occupied, 
but upon control over the persons who might freely occupy and use it if not restrained 
in their acts. The result of control in both cases would be almost if not quite, identi-
cal, although the exercise of control would arise from principles entirely different. 
The essential feature of ownership is the exclusion of all others from the use and 
enjoyment of the thing owned. This is equally true of personal and real property. 
Ownership in the case of land in Spitsbergen could not, therefore exist. All persons 
cannot be excluded. Only those persons could be excluded whose governments have 
conferred upon the insular government the right to exclude them. Exclusive use and 
occupancy is lacking, and so land in Spitsbergen cannot, in the true sense, be owned. 
If, however, the governments of the world should with substantial unanimity 
agree that their respective nationals might by. direction of the government formed 
by them for Spitsbergen as their common agent be excluded from the occupancy and 
use of land unless specifically privileged to do so, the effect could be similiar to that 
resulting from ownership, although it would lack the permanency of the right based 
on territorial sovereignty, for it would be liable to the invasion of nationals of a Power 
which had not conferred any portion of its political sovereignty upon the government 
established. In the case of ownership, the right of exclusion is complete and is derived 
from the delegated power to control persons of certain nationalities who might other-
wise enter upon the land. 
Lansing, A Unique International Problem, 11 AM. J. INT'L L. 763, at 769 (1917). 
10. For a general definition of positivism, see R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, 17 
(1978). 
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mous speech in Alice Through the Looking Glass.•• Other writers 
have taken other views. Such views are not only reflected in Presi-
dent Taft's State of the Union Address, 12 but also in the Treaty of 
Paris of 1919 in which the signatory powers recognized Norwegian 
sovereignty over the Archipelago, but preserved all rights which had 
been "acquired" while the islands were without a sovereign. Again, 
an alternative view of property was reflected in the writings of John 
Locke who wrote in the late 17th century .13 This of course is very 
much like modern economic theory regarding property. For exam-
ple, Professor Demsetz tells us that when a resource becomes 
scarce, sufficiently scarce to require the internalization of externali-
ties, there is motivation for viewing it as property and thus exclud-
ing others, usually by some kind of implicit or explicit arrange-
ment.1' Locke and Dempsetz are not very far apart. But their lan-
guage games are very different from that of the followers of John 
Austin and the 19th century positivists. 15 
11. L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS (1871). 
12. See note 8 supra. 
13. Earlier than Austin, John Locke (whose views helped frame the ideas of the Ameri-
can Revolution) took the view that property rights antedated the state and resulted from the 
combination of "nature" and "labor". He wrote, in his Second Treatise of Civil Government: 
Thus the law of reason makes the deer that Indian's who hath killed it .... And 
amongst those who are counted the civilized part of mankind who have made and 
multiplied positive laws to determine property, this original law of nature, for the 
beginning of property in what was before common still takes place; and by virtue 
thereof what fish any one catches in the ocean, that great and still remaining common 
of mankind, or what ambergris any one takes up here, is, by the labor that removes 
it out of that common state nature left it in, made his property who takes that pains 
about it. 
J . LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 30, reprinted in J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT 135-136 (1956). 
14. An economist, Harold Demsetz, has offered a view of property differing from both 
Lansing's and Locke's. He writes: 
A primary function of property rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve a greater 
internation internalization of externalities. Every cost and benefit associated with 
social interdependencies is a potential externality. One condition is necessary to 
make costs and benefits externalities. The cost of a transaction in the rights between 
the parties (internalization) must exceed the gains from internalization. In general, 
transacting cost can be large relative to gains because of "natural" difficulties in 
trading or they can be largely because of legal reasons. In a lawful society the prohibi-
tion of voluntary negotiations makes the cost of transacting infinite. Some costs and 
l>enefits are not taken into account by users of resources whenever externalities exist, 
but allowing transactions increases the degree to which internalization takes place. 
Demsetz, Towards a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AMERICAl\l ECONOMIC REVIEW 347 at 348 
(1967). 
15. The question of determining the existence of property rights depends on the defini-
tion of property, and of the legal order establishing that definition, a language game. If a 
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The practical nien who established, and bought and sold, and 
made money out of their mining tracts on Spitsbergen took a differ-
ent view of their rights from that of the positivists. They were guided 
by the utility of internalizing the externalities of taking coal from 
economically-sized tracts. Accordingly, before 1920 they established 
a regime whose basic agreement ("social contract") may be summa-
rized as follows: 
"This is my tract because I am working it." 
"That is your tract because everybody is working theirs the way 
you and I are working our separate tracts." 
"That other has no tract, he is stealing." 
"If he operates outside the regime then their governments will 
speak to his." 
"If their governments refuse to speak or if his neglects the repre-
sentations of theirs will the game be at an end?" 
"That is a matter of choice, every legal order can be put to an 
end by agreement or be violently overthrown." 16 
The power of a legal order to enforce or protect rights may be a 
social necessity, but it is not a legal or logical necessity. The legal 
order itself is, after all, the arrangement whereby rights can be 
created or distributed. The question of enforcement is simply not 
one of validity, but one of effectiveness. 
Having talked about the traditional customary law issues, I 
would now like to point out that customary law is always subject to 
change. The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS III) has developed the "Economic Zone." It is possi-
ble to argue that the combination of a general acceptance of a prin-
ciple in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
as mirrored in the various negotiating texts, plus an increasingly 
person stipulates an Austinian definition of property he will deny the existence of property 
outside the existence of the Austinian order-the sovereign state as the premise of laws. But 
the conclusion is tautologous: it is inherent in the premise if he accepts some oth~r definition, 
for example, that of Demsetz, the sovereign state may not be essential. What Demsetz, 
perceives as necessary is a social (political?) arrangement whereby property rights can arise 
"when it becomes economic for those affected by externalities to internalize benefits and 
costs." Id. at 354. These can arise in a societal organization that knows no sovereign common 
to all the participants. 
16. It should be clear that the participants in the Spitsbergen mining activities did much 
more than play a language game peculiar and limited only to that archipelago prior to the 
Treaty of Paris's signature in 1920. They provided an example. Moreover, that had, and still 
has, sufficient economic validity and utility in terms of the internalization of externalities, 
and had a normative content, to constitute a precedent which is available for articulating a 
regime governing deep seabed mining for the present day-subject only to contradictory 
developments in customary international law. 
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widespread state practice reflecting the consensus which led to the 
formulation of the doctrine in those tests, can come to constitute 
law. In this way more and more countries, including our own United 
States, are putting into effect a "law" of the economic zone. The 
process is one which today arises from the interaction of conferences 
and state practice, whereby legal change can come about more rap-
idly than it ever has in the past. We need to realize that indeed the 
Law of the Sea Conference now going on is not merely or even 
primarily today a codification conference. It is also an institution 
seeking to establish law reform and legal change. It is more of a 
political and economic conference than simply a legal one. It is also 
involved with institution building-the creation of new institu-
tions-and is guided by the need to resolve problems of economic 
redistribution. These are very important additional factors in the 
contemporary formation of customary international law. One ques-
tion of great interest is: When and how far can we say that custom-
ary international law is changing, is about to change, or has started 
to change? 
Today, perh8.ps, we may see the impending emergence of a new 
dimension in the law of deep seabed mining. In Article 29 of the 
United Nations Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of 
States (1974), Resolution of the General Assembly 3281 (XXIX), 
there is a declaration that "the seabed and ocean floor and the 
subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, as well as 
the resources of the area, are the common heritage of mankind." 17 
This reiterates the "common heritage" declaration of the earlier 
General Assembly's Resolution (namely 2749 (XXV) of 17 Decem-
ber 1970) on the regime of the resources of deep seabed.18 
Have these resolutions crystallized into law? And would such a 
law make illegal any form of deep seabed mining beyond national 
jurisdiction outside the regime to be devised at UNCLOS III? 
At the San Francisco Conference of 1945 which drafted the 
Charter of the United Nations, 19 a proposal was made which would 
have given the General Assembly power to declare international 
law. This was firmly rejected. But what would then be the status of 
such Resolutions as those containing the declarations of the 
"common heritage"? There are two levels of effectiveness to be con-
sidered. First, resolutions of this kind, of themselves, cannot be self-
17. G.A. Res. 3281, 31 U.N. GAOR, (Supp. 31) 50 U.N. Doc. N9631 (1974). 
18. G.A. Res. 2749, 1 U.N. GAOR, (Supp. 27-28) 24 (1970). 
19. The Charter entered into force (for the United States as well on 24 Oct. 1945). 
8
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 6, No. 2 [1979], Art. 3
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol6/iss2/3
1978-79] Customary International Law 181 
executing. They are not legislation with immediately obligating ef-
fects. Some resolutions, however, such as that on decolonization, 
through both the widespread support they received and the speedy 
implementation of their goals in the practice of states, especially in 
practice of the former colonizing states, have become recognized as 
customary international law. On the other hand, when implemen-
tation by universal or near universal state practice is lacking, the 
relevant resolutions have merely the quality of the "policy direc-
tives" of say, the Irish and Indian Constitutions. 
But such "policy directives" are not entir~ly ineffective. They 
do at least impose duties of respect and recognition by virtue of their 
moral force. A state acting against their terms should thoroughly 
consider its compelling reasons for so acting, especially if, while 
some states choose to ignore that directive, others are building up a 
state practice in its support. So far, there has been little, if any, 
state practice implementing the "common heritage" principle. 
There is a further consideration. Where states act, even if in 
order to implement a General Assembly Resolution, in a manner 
which invades the existing rights of other states and involves 
breaches of international law, further grave issues are raised. Today, 
for example, the seizure of a foreign flagship, without lawful justifi-
cation (that is, without the justification of a treaty, customary 
international law, right or privilege so to act), is a breach of the 
customary international law of the sea. It also involves a breach of 
the United Nations Charter (including Article 2, paragraph 4). 20 
While, traditionally, customary international law could once have 
been created through acts which were originally unlawful · if ac-
quiesced to for a sufficiently long period and on a sufficiently wide 
basis, it is doubtful whether the world community would today 
accept a legal principle based on acts in defiance of the United 
Nations Charter. It is to be doubted, furthermore, if the essential 
ingredient of acquiescence would be forthcoming. It should be 
noted, therefore, that a state practice seeking to implement the 
"common heritage" principle should not itself be steeped in initial 
illegality. This may well leave the establishment of that principle 
to the consent of the states concerned in a universal or nearly uni-
versal convention rather than through the high-handed unilateral 
20. Article 2, paragraph 4 states: "All members shall give the United Nations every 
assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain 
from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or 
enforcement action." 
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and illegal acts of states seeking, through confrontation tactics, to 
establish what they claim (and mistakenly claim, it is insisted) to 
be a state practice leading to the creation of a purposed rule of 
customary international law. 
It seems to me, therefore, that here and now we are in a situa-
tion of stasis. On the one hand, there is an imminent possibility of 
change; on the other, there is no body of law prohibiting deep seabed 
mining. Furthermore, many of the acts which might be taken to 
prevent such mining could themselves constitute serious breaches 
of international law-for example, infringement of the rights of the 
flag nation of a mining ship, breaches of the "rules of the road," and 
illegal searches and seizures. 
Now, very briefly, I would like to run down the alternatives for 
possible blueprints of a seabed authority. They are, as they seem to 
me, to turn on the issues of the authority of the agent or the trustee 
of mankind for its "common heritage" (when and if this becomes 
an accepted legal concept either through treaty or community prac-
tice despite its obvious conceptual difficulties). There are several 
forms for seabed authority. First, there is the model that was fa-
vored originally and probably still is favored (with some regrets) by 
the United States. Its function is to simply license private entrepre-
neurs and state enterprises. It would merely issue licenses for ex-
clusive mining rights in fixed areas or tracts to either the state 
owned public corporations or the private enterprise (depending on 
the economic organization of the country of the applicant). That 
applicant would then work the seabed area. This model (that of the 
straight licensing authority), however, seems to me to be dead as far 
as the Third United Conference on the Law of the Sea is concerned. 
Second, there is the opposite of this model; namely, that of 
Operating Authority. This would concentrate prospecting, mining, 
transportation, processing, and distribution of seabed mining re-
sources {particularly the manganese nodules) in the Authority. 
Third, there is a compromise plan-an Operating Authority subcon-
tracting its management contracts, servicing contracts, and the like 
to enterprises, which would carry out, under their contracts, the 
various essential tasks involved in seabed mining. Finally, there is 
the position that western countries and the United States are now 
supporting. Today it is called the Parallel System. The Parallel 
System combines all three of the above. The Authority may subcon-
tract if necessary, or operate on its own, and where the Authority 
does not engage in operations, exclusive mining tracts may be re-
served for enterprises engaging in seabed mining under the licensing 
concept. 
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PANEL DISCUSSION 
MR. HULL: At this point we will have a panel discussion and to 
the extent there are questions from the audience we will try to 
entertain those also. 
AMBASSADOR ALDRICH: Fred, I want to ask you whether you see 
a distinction between a property interest or title to recover nodules 
from the seabed and a property interest giving an exclusive right to 
exploit an area of the seabed. At the time your claim was submitted 
in 1974, I was advising Dr. Kissinger. It seemed to me that there was 
a considerable distinction between one's right to the nodules that 
he pulls up from the sea and one's right to stake out an area of the 
high seas for his exclusive use in mining. We certainly would have 
had problems if someone had staked out a fishing area and claimed 
exclusive right to catch all the fish within that area. Your case seems 
to have greater force if you rely on the title to the nodules rather 
than the exclusive right to mine the area. 
PROF. GOLDIE: Thank you, George. Of course there is a distinc-
tion between the title to the nodules already captured and those 
that ·remain to be found. Today a large portion of my presentation 
related to the issue of possessary rights and title to captured, 
"apprehended," nodules because I have been surprised to see that 
those rights are being criticized in the journals. In my view the 
answer to the first part of your question is covered by the traditional 
and general principles of finders' rights and of possession.' The sec-
ond half of your question is much more difficult to answer. It is fairly 
easy to think of a "climbing boy" who finds a jewel while climbing 
in· a chimney being able to keep it as against the interest of his 
master the chimney sweep. 2 Similarly, we would not challenge the 
ownership by a soldier of a diamond ring he found in a window 
frame. 3 These situations come within the realm of the rights of 
finders to possess that which they have already brought under their 
hand. The problem, however, of extending this concept of finding 
to a seabed tract is a difficult one. Perhaps Mike Ely and 1 did force 
the issue a little bit, but I am not unhappy with the case we estab-
lished. 
The starting point is, of course, the universal theory of miners' 
rights. It is a general principal of law recognized by civilized nations 
1. For a discussion of finder's rights, see c. SMITH & R. BOYER, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF 
PROPERTY 456 (2d ed. 1971). 
2. Armory v. Delamire, [1722] K.B. 1 Strange 505. 
3. Hannah v. Peel, [1945] 1 K.B. 509. 
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fitting within the frame of Article 38 paragraph c of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice. 4 The application thereof in the 
Spitsbergen Analogy5 gives added force to the proposition that per-
haps the traditional law of finders had not been studied adequately 
from the point of view of the nature or the extent of what is found. 
No one questions the result in the case of the found jewel, the lost 
bank notes, the Viking ship under the pond or the burial mound and 
so on. But when it comes to something more extensive, difficulties 
ensue as to the nature of the object of the finder's rights. Neverthe-
less, miners' rights have been widely recognized. Finders' rights to 
groups of things are also present in some special transnational cus-
toms as reflected in the salvage cases of the Tubantia, 6 Gironia, 7 and 
the Santa Maria de la Rosa8 or in Galapagos whale fisheries." In a 
world of scepticism in which we find ourselves, the burden of proof 
has been very heavy to carry and many are only too happy to pro-
mote the belief that it has not been discharged. From your perspec-
tive, the advice you gave Secretary Kissinger nullifying the claim 
did not, arguably, deny a specifically sanctioned right. However, it 
would not have been wrong, under the law, to have been more sym-
pathetic to Deepsea Ventures' 10 position as well. In my view, more-
over, it was mistaken to look for an affirmation of the right. All 
that was necessary was the lack of prohibition plus the Spitsbergen 
and other analogies. 
In response, George, to your question drawing upon the tradi-
tional international law of fisheries, I would like to make the follow-
ing brief adumbration of a response to a complex question. First, I 
must stress that, when it comes to comparing seabed mining rights 
with fishing, there are some very important distinctions. The taking 
of fishing involves the total habitat of the fish, that is the whole 
water column, with its multifarious uses, needs and resources. 
4. l.C.J. Stat. art. 38, reprinted in, s. ROSENER, DOCUMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 
OF JUSTICE 77 (1974). 
5. For a comprehensive discussion of the Spitsbergen analogy, see Goldie, Mining Rights 
and the Generallnternational Law Regime of the Deep Ocean Floor, 2 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 
1, 19 (1975). 
6. [1924] P. 78. 
7. See News and Notes, 1 INT'L J. ARCHAEOLOGY & UNDERWATER EXPLORATION 224 (1972). 
(This case is an unreported case in the trial section of the Supreme Court of Belfast, Northern 
Ireland). See also Morris v. Lyonesse Salvage Co. (The Association v. The Romney), l1970j 
2 Lloyd's List L. R. 59 (Adm. 1970). 
8. [1953] 1 W.L.R. 246 (Aden Sup. Ct. 1953). 
9. [1951] l.C.J. 116. 
10. See note 5 supra at 50. 
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Seabed mining, on the other hand, envisages the exploitation of a 
single resource existing only on the seabed and mainly in the desert 
area of the ocean. This takes place in an environment approaching 
an almost two-dimensional situation. It does not, furthermore, in-
volve the exclusion of many valid uses of the sea as a spatial re-
source. Nodules are simply not present to enter into any competi-
tion for priorities. 
Secondly, the international law of fisheries to which you make 
reference is the result of very special political pressures, as well as 
philosophical theories, germane to the evalution of Western Europe, 
especially those deriving from the Anglo-Dutch rivalries regarding 
the North Sea fishery and from theories of natural law, of the rela-
tion of Man and Nature, and of the conditions necessary for the 
creation of property rights. 
Finally, I note a touch of irony in your question. After all, what 
is the United States' very limited acceptance of the Economic Zone? 
Surely, the United States has agreed internationally, as it has legis-
lated domestically, to the exclusive right of catching fish in the area 
in question-an area, may I remind you, of far greater extent than 
any which I have proposed as a "reasonable" area for claiming an 
exclusive right to deep seabed mining. 
MR. HERMAN: I am interested in the comments that Professor 
Goldie made with respect to the development of customary interna-
tional law in the area of the use of the seas. I agree with him to the 
extent it is possible to say that there may not be any law which 
prevents individuals from mining the seabed. I am not convinced of 
that, but that is a possible result from his statements and from my 
own point of view. Certainly there is notliing that specifically sanc-
tions it. I would like to emphasize that point. It is difficult to say 
that customary law of the sea or notions of freedom of the high seas 
admits to the right to mine the seabed. While it may, I think any 
state that puts its eggs in that basket is asking for trouble. 
The notion of freedom of the high seas rests on the concept that 
the high seas are res communis (common land). Res communis 
means that the sea is common property which belongs to all and 
cannot be appropriated by anyone in an exclusive manner. The 
concept of res nullius or no man's land, which is applied in the 
Spitsbergen case, allows states to make claims to no man's land. In 
the Spitsbergen analogy, which I find difficult to draw, is a question 
of conflicting national claims to sovereignty by states and nationals 
pursuing activities in a situation where those sovereignty claims 
have not been resolved. If the freedom of the high seas is founded 
13
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on the concept of res communis, it would appear that no state can 
purport to exercise any measure of exclusivity in that particular 
area. It is certain that no person can purport to exercise any exclu-
sive rights or exclusive claims in that particular area. That, I think, 
is the fundamental flaw in the Deepsea Ventures claim. It was pur-
porting to appropriate to its own possession an area which, even if 
it could be characterized as res nullius, could only be appropriated 
by states themselves. But I tend to think that it is very difficult to 
characterize the seas as res nullius since to do so would immediately 
admit of the possibility of exclusive claims by states themselves to 
areas of the seas or the seabed. What Ambassador Aldrich has said 
about the likely illegality of persons or states appropriating exclu-
sive fisheries to their own use in an area which is legally common 
property, I think, applies with equal force in the case of seabed 
nodules. Moreover, if you look at the history of the development of 
the freedom of the high seas, the primary focus was initially on 
freedom of transit and communication. 11 This runs through the com-
mentary on the law of prize and booty by Grotius. 12 The secondary 
use of the seas was for fishing purposes. You can take the fish, but 
you cannot take all the fish. You can simply use the oceans to take 
some of the fish. To go beyond that and try to apply these notions 
which developed in respect of the water column to the seabed would 
be to extend the notion of freedom of the high seas, as it is known 
in customary international law, beyond permissible limits. 
PROF. GOLDIE: Mr. Herman, I would just like to make two fairly 
empirical points regarding your comments. First, with regard to 
your view that the Deepsea Ventures claim was seeking to assert 
some kind of exclusive territorial claim in terms of using the seabed 
as an extensive resource, the notice of claim said: 
Deepsea [Ventures, Inc.] asserts the exclusive rights to develop, 
evaluate, and mine the Deposit and take, use, and sell all the man-
ganese nodules in, and the minerals and metals derived, therefrom. 
It is proceeding with appropriate diligence to do so, and requests 
and requires States, persons, and all other commercial or political 
entities to respect the exclusive rights asserted herein. Deepsea 
[Ventures, Inc.] does not assert, or ask the United States of Amer-
ica to assert, a territorial claim to the seabed or subsoil underlying 
the Deposit. 13 
11. See generally I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 207 (1966). 
12. For a brief description of this famous work and a summary of where it has been 
translated into English, see G. GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 40 (3d ed. 1976). 
13. See note 5 supra, at 50-1. 
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When we were drafting this notice of claim we were very concerned 
to draw the distinction between profits a prendre and any assertion 
of territorial res corporales claims-the distinction being the con-
veyancers' one between incorporeal and corporeal hereditaments. 
Secondly, I cannot agree with your historical evaluation of the 
Spitsbergen situation. The various miners were not seen by the 
governments of that time as the carriers of state territorial claims. 
During that period of the late 1880's, it was common knowledge that 
the occupation of previously unoccupied territory could not be con-
ducted by settlement, as the Jan Mayen Island' 4 case tells us. 
Rather, it could be conducted only by acts of sovereignty as the 
Permanent Court of International Justice told us in the Status of 
Eastern Greenland 15 case, with its twin requirements of the 
"intention and will to act as sovereign and some actual exercise or 
display of such authority." There was neither any effective 
"intention or will" nor "display of such authority" over Spitsbergen 
before Norway took over the sovereignity of the Archipelago under 
the Treaty of Paris of 1920. Although case law did not, at that time, 
exist with regard to Spitsbergen, the theory had already been enun-
ciated that the fact of an American, a Britisher, or a Dutchman 
digging coal was totally irrelevant as far as the contest of competing 
sovereigns was concerned. Furthermore, the only countries that ac-
tively desired to appropriate Spitsbergen at the time of which we 
are speaking (1890-1920) were the ones that are still quarreling 
about it today. They are Norway and Russia. The problem faced by 
the other countries was that no country wanted to see anyone else 
exercise full territorial sovereignity over the island. An analogy can 
be drawn with a dog with a bone that it does not want to chew but 
regarding which it still drives other dogs away. This was the govern-
mental situation, as I interpreted it, on Spitsbergen at that time. 
Indeed, President Taft in his message to Congress 16 said that the 
United States was only interested in protecting the vested rights of 
American citizens who were engaged in commercial activities on the 
Island. I just mention this because if we take the Austinian ap-
proach, then we necessarily have to look for a government. If a fellow 
carried a passport to Spitsbergen at that time, we would be tempted 
14. Jacobsen v. Norwegian Government, [1933) Ann. Dig. 109 (No. 42) (Sup. Ct., Nor-
way 1933). 
15. [1933) P.C.l.J., ser. A/B, No. 53. 
16. Annual Message of the President to Congress, December 7, 1909, l1909J For. Rels. 
U.S . IX, at xiii (1914 ed.). 
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to say, "Aha, you see. He carried a passport." But it might have just 
been an identity card as far as he was concerned, or he may have 
forgotten to drop it out of his pocket. We have this propensity to give 
much weight to slight details because of the way we read the law. 
We have successfully learned to make a conscious effort to find a 
legal order without an Austinian sovereign, without a policeman at 
the crossroads. But the errors connected with Austinian analysis 
clearly still stultify international legal analysis, unfortunately. 
CONGRESSMAN MCCLOSKEY: Professor Goldie, it is always in-
triguing to a politician when a large mining company seeks to legi-
timize its operations by hiring a distinguished law professor from a 
famous university. And I am also somewhat amused that the law 
professor sits next to a distinguished representative of the Peoples 
Republic of China whose leader once mentioned that legal rights 
come out of the barrel of a gun. 
I would like to pose to you the question as to whether or not the 
Spitsbergen example, to which you refer, has not been materially 
changed by the adoption in 1970 by the United Nations General 
Assembly of the resolution, 17 in which the United States partici-
pated, that the resources of the deep seabed are the common heri-
tage of mankind. In the claim that you filed, you indicated that 
Deepsea Ventures was not attempting to exert a claim over an area 
of the seabed. That incidentally is reflected in section 101 111 of the 
bill that was passed by the House last year in which we said that 
by enactment of this act, the United States does not thereby assert 
sovereignty, sovereign or exclusive rights over, or the ownership of, 
any area of the deep seabed. In that connection, we have recently 
seen at least two examples where citizens of the world have sought 
to restrain the exercise of navigation. I refer to the case in New 
Zealand where the New Zealanders sent a fleet of sail boats to 
prevent a United States nuclear cruiser from entering Wellington 
Harbor because of the deep feelings they had against nuclear power. 
They wanted to keep nuclear power, and any evidence of nuclear 
power, out of their portion of the world. More recently, a second 
example is Greenpeace, where United States citizens tried to inter-
pose their small ships between Russian whaling vessels and the 
resources of the high seas. Whales, we all recognize, customarily 
17. The Declarations of Principles, G.A. Res. 2749 (25, U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.28) 24, 
U.N. Doc. N8097 (1970). 
18. Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resource Act, H.R. Rep. No. 3350, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1977). 
16
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 6, No. 2 [1979], Art. 3
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol6/iss2/3
1978-79] Customary International Law 189 
have been subject to capture by ships of various nations. Now, 
should the United States enact a law which permits United States 
citizens to explore for minerals in given areas of the South Pacific, 
for example, where we have told the inhabitants of the islands 
rather firmly that, while we have the right to protect our 200 mile 
zone and fish within that 200 mile zone, they do not have the right 
to prevent our tuna fishermen from going into the 200 mile zones of 
their respective countries to take tuna since we deem tuna to be 
migratory prey, can we not then expect that any American unilater-
ally granted license to harvest the resources in the deep seabed is 
not going to be met by a fleet of individuals seeking to frustrate the 
harvesting of those deep seabed minerals. And if a deep seabed 
mining ship, for example, was frustrated in carrying out its opera-
tions under a U.S. license, what would be that ship's and that 
company's legal rights with respect to those who sought to 
interpose? 
PROF. GOLDIE: That is one of the best hypotheticals I have ever 
heard. 
CONGRESSMAN MCCLOSKEY: I do not think it is a hypothetical. 
If we license and if we continue this kind of unilateral operation, we 
can expect Fiji Islanders, New Zealanders, and perhaps the Chinese 
to properly attempt to inhibit our operations as we have seen United 
States citizens seek to inhibit the Russian whaling operations. The 
question is very simple: What are the legal rights of the mining 
companies? 
PROF. GOLDIE: I question the adverb "properly." But even that 
is not the real question. After all, when King Hussan of Morocco 
sent the great number of poor people into the Western Sahara, he 
knew this was contrary to the legal rights of Spain and even to the 
legal rights, at least according to Algeria, of the inhabitants of the 
territory. But it is very hard when unarmed people interpose their 
vulnerable bodies between an enterprise or a government and the 
legalities of the situation. You have to look at the humanistic ele-
ments which, I think, are totally dichotomous with the legal ones. 
CONGRESSMAN MCCLOSKEY: In other words, there is no legal 
right you can define. 
PROF. GOLDIE: The legal rights I think are clear. 
CONGRESSMAN MCCLOSKEY: But if the legal rights are clear, 
what are they? 
PROF. GOLDIE The legal rights are that you can proceed with 
your operation. 
17
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CONGRESSMAN MCCLOSKEY: Do these rights include ramming 
the other ship? 
PROF. GOLDIE If they do not obey the rule of the road I would 
think so. The only instruction I think need be legally given is to 
comply with the rule of the road. 
CONGRESSMAN MCCLOSKEY: Does the rule of the road permit a 
ship steaming in a straight direction to continue that course if an-
other ship crosses its bow? 
PROF. GOLDIE: Steam always gives way to sail under the tradi-
tional rules. 
CONGRESSMAN MCCLOSKEY: In other words, the sailing ship that 
is anchored across the bow of the slowly steaming mining ship has 
the right to stay there and the mining ship must alter course. But 
the technology of mining operations, as I understand it, requires a 
steaming mining ship to pursue a straight course since it is drag-
ging something five miles below it across the surface of the under 
sea. So what are the rights of three sailing schooners who have 
stationed themselves across the bow of the slowly steaming mining 
ship? Who has to give way? 
MR. YouNG: There are also provisions in the rules of the road 
that require others to yield the right of way if you are displaying the 
·proper signals that you are engaged in certain underwater opera-
tions.19 I think these provisions also apply to other things besides 
trawling. If you are indicating an operation by appropriate signals, 
then you have the right to proceed. 
PROF. GOLDIE: A preliminary point should be emphasised. 
While Mr. McCloskey is correct in asserting that whales may be 
taken without limit as to number, size or species under customary 
international law, the Convention For the Regulation of Whaling of 
194620 and its successor agreements, to which both the Soviet Union 
and Japan are parties, limit what may be taken in both respects. 
Much of the anger, according to the news media, among the sup-
porters of the Greenpeace caper is that the whaling activities with 
which the Greenpeace supporters interfere, are said to be contrary 
to the whaling conventions. No similar convention, and no custom-
ary international law rules, currently exist whereby the mining of 
manganese nodules is limited to quotas and sizes of these mineral 
lumps. Furthermore, the sympathy factors which Greenpeace 
evokes in the case of threatened species of cetaceans have no similar 
19. The International Rules of the Road are codified in 33 U.S.C. § 142, et seq. (1976). 
20. 16 u.s.c. § 916 (1976). 
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pull upon the heartstrings when applied to manganese nodules. In 
the case of these inanimate denizens of the seabed, political interest 
would appear to focus rather heavily on protecting existing suppliers 
of nickel, cobalt, tin and manganese, or by expressing personal dis-
likes of corporate enterprises. The suppliers of the foregoing com-
modities in Canada, South Africa and the Soviet Union seem espe-
cially vulnerable. 
I would now like to turn to the more specific aspects of Mr. 
McCloskey's question. My answer which follows like Mr. McClos-
key's question, assumes as given something which may not be true 
of a mining ship proceeding on her mining operations, namely that 
she is tracking in the direction in which she is heading. Given this 
premise, my answer will then turn upon the applicable "rules of the 
road" to be observed by ships on the highseas-the International 
Rules. There are two such sets of rules which are immediately rele-
vant. The first tells us that a powered ship gives way to sail. 21 Thus, 
if the interposing vessels were sailing (and not powered) ships they 
would be privileged. This would entail their maintaining their 
course and speed which they may not be prepared to do. (The 
Greenpeace interferences seem more to be the darting of small boats 
about in the track of the whaling vessels.) The second applicable 
rule of the road provides that vessels engaging in specified activities, 
including "underwater operations" (e.g. seabed mining), and show-
ing the appropriate shapes by day and lights by night, are the 
"stand-on" vessels under the new (1977) US Coast Guard Naviga-
tion Rules-International (CG-169)-known as the privileged ves-
sels under the old rules and other vessels, which may be on colli-
sion courses or on courses that are close to collision courses,. with 
them, whether powered or driven by sail, must take the avoiding 
action. The stand-on vessels, under these circumstances, not only 
have the right, but also the duty, of maintaining their course and 
speed by day or by night.22 
Should the situation become one of in extremis a further set of 
problems may arise, especially for the interfering (blockading) 
yachtsmen. But there is one basic principle for somebody advising 
a Greenpeace-type of caper to remember, namely that the vessel 
which invokes the in extremis rule must establish that the emer-
gency in which she finds herself is not the result of her own fault. 
In the hypothetical situation Mr. McCloskey has envisaged, the 
21. See note 19 supra. 
22. Id. 
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emergency situation would have intentionally been created by the 
yachtsmen deliberately blocking the path of the privileged ship. In 
light of the relevant rules of the road, a lawyer is bound by the ethics 
of his profession to advise persons against taking action which is in 
breach of the law and against knowingly exposing themselves to the 
hazard of death.23 Furthermore, Mr. McCloskey's question does not 
seem to raise the moral issues which one usually connects, or even 
may possibly connect, with civil disobedience.24 
Finally, with regards to the incident in Wellington Harbor, I 
have always felt that my former fellow citizens in Australia and New 
Zealand are every bit as hypocritical as we Americans. They also 
have nuclear power stations on land so I could never understand 
why there was such a fuss. 
CONGRESSMAN McCLOSKEY: The fuss is occasioned because citi-
zens in those countries, like in the United States, do not necessarily 
agree with their governmental policies. 
PROF. GOLDIE: They still switch the lights on at home. 
CONGRESSMAN MCCLOSKEY: I am not aware of any action by 
either the Australian or New Zealand governments to deter those 
who sought to inhibit the arrival of the United States nuclear 
cruiser. Nor am I aware of any action by the United States govern-
ment to stop Greenpeace people from inhibiting the whaling by the 
Russian whaling fleet. And that particular example, I think, is pre-
cise with respect to what the citizens of foreign countries might do 
to a government licensed mining ship from the United States. 
PROF. GOLDIE: This is a very interesting hypothetical and, as 
formulated by the Hon. Mr. McCloskey, it raises important issues 
of civil disobedience and, so it seems to me, risks that civil disobedi-
ence may occur at sea which do not arise on land. At sea the call of 
neccessity is more stark and primitively selective. Should we paint 
the devil on the wall and say we cannot do anything because some-
body else might make us look like unkind people? 
CONGRESSMAN McCLOSKEY: The problem that is faced by the 
United States Congress right now is that we are asked to enact this 
legislation because if we do not do so mining companies will not 
have a favorable investment climate within which to spend the $500 
to $700 million each that is required to continue with the develop-
ment of this technology and to proceed with deep seabed mining. If 
23. See e.g., Code of Professional Responsiblity DR 7-102(A)(8) (1976). 
24. For a full discussion of civil disobedience, see R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 
206 (1978). 
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the lack of a license is an inhibiting factor to the proceedings of deep 
seabed mining companies, conceivably the bankers who finance 
them might not want to go ahead if they were advised that their 
investment could not be realized because individuals, acting within 
their legal rights, could reasonably be expected to effectively block 
mining operations. 
PROF. GOLDIE: I really think that Mr. McCloskey's hypothetical 
should never be permitted to happen. Lives will inevitably be put 
at risk. But if it does, I think that there are rules of the road which 
could mean that whatever ensuing tragedies might occur would be 
as ineffective as those portrayed in "Darkness at Noon," "1984" and 
"1985." 
CONGRESSMAN MCCLOSKEY: I only want to say that as lawyers 
we have an obligation not to try to predict what will happen, but to 
advise our clients before they make their investments of the worst 
possible case that could happen. 
PROF. GOLDIE: But here is an important ethical point. A lawyer 
should never advise either criminal activity or activity which pre-
dictably would be the target of an injunction. Also, a lawyer who 
invites a client to put his life at risk is carrying a far weightier 
burden of conscience than a general who risks the Ii ves of the troops 
under his command. An ethical distinction is the imperative here. 
MR. LEE: Congressman McCloskey earlier asked Professor Gol-
die whether the customary law has been changed because of the 
United Nations resolution.25 I feel duty bound to get back to this 
issue. I think that one of the very basic issues that presents itself is 
whether there have been any changes in traditional customary law 
since 1967. I was very pleased to hear that Professor Goldie believes 
there might be some changes. He gave the example of economic zone 
practice. With respect to seabed mining, I think that we ought to 
look at the 1970 General Assembly Declaration of Principles Gov-
erning the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof, 
beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction. 26 This declaration cov-
ers fifteen basic principles which state in essence that the seabed 
and the ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction as well as the re-
sources of the seabed are the common heritage of mankind and that 
the seabed shall not he subject to appropriation by any means, by 
states or persons, natural or juridical, and no state shall claim sover-
eignty or sovereign rights over any part of the ocean floor. The 
25. See note 17 supra. 
26. Id. 
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declaration further states that the exploration and exploitation of 
resources of the seabed and other related activities shall be governed 
by the international regime to be established. Moreover, the explo-
ration of the seabed and the exploitation of its resources shall be 
carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole. Finally, the decla-
ration calls for the establishment of an international regime, to give 
effect to the provisions, by an international treaty of a universal 
character generally agreed upon. 
This declaration was unanimously adopted with only fourteen 
Eastern European countries abstaining. The United States and all 
other industrial countries voted for the declaration. Since 1970, the 
Eastern European countries have reversed their position and now 
endorse the declaration. This is clearly manifested in their last 
statement at the seventh resumed session of the Law of the Sea 
Conference.27 At that session, the chairman of the Group of Seventy-
seven made a statement proclaiming the illegality of any unilateral 
legislative action for seabed mining, 28 and, subsequent to his state-
ment, supporting statements were made by China, Russia, Poland, 
the German Democratic Republic, Sweden, Norway, Finland, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand and Australia. 211 It can therefore be seen 
that since 1970, there has been a universal consensus on the legal 
position of the seabed regime as indicated by the voting in the most 
representative organ of the international community. 
We all recognize and accept that the United Nations is not a 
legislative body and cannot pass any binding resolutions. But we 
also accept as international lawyers that the resolutions from the 
General Assembly are a form of international law. They are recog-
nized as such within article 38 of the statute of the International 
Court of Justice.30 I would like to ask Professor Goldie whether or 
not enough evidence exists, since 1970, to enable us to ascertain the 
status of international law with respect to the seabed regime. My 
personal view is that a customary law has already emerged in light 
of the practice over the last seven years. I was a bit disturbed that 
27. The Conference was held in Caracas. Particular attention was focused on the ques-
tion of the system of exploration and exploitation of the seabed beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction. For an analysis of the Conference, see Adede, The System for Exploitation of 
the "Common Heritage of Mankind" at the Caracas Conference, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 31 (1975). 
28. The Group of Seventy-seven is a coalition of developing states now numbering over 
100, which come primarily from Latin America, Africa and Asia. Although the Group- of 
Seventy-seven is by no means a solid block of states, it has exhibited a large degree of unity 
on matters discussed in the seabed negotiations. See id. 
29. U.N. Doc. NConf. 62/Bur/Sr 41 (Aug. 30, 1978). 
30. See note 4 supra. 
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Professor Goldie's excellent summary did not cover the more recent 
developments since 1970. 
PROF. GOLDIE: In response to Mr. McCloskey, let me repeat my 
view that he is using the argument of civil disobedience in terms of 
the rights of those who disobey. This is what the Moroccans did. I 
would not advise a client that he should not invest in the X or the 
Y corporation because it may become the ta~get of civil disobedi-
ence. If that were the case, I suppose we should advise against 
buying stock in Niagara Mohawk while it continues to invest in 
nuclear power stations. 
With regard to Roy Lee's question, my own perception is that 
the Moratorium Resolution31 had such a large opposition and such 
a large number of abstaining votes that it cannot be regarded as 
reflecting state practice until very positive acts are taken. With 
regard to the Declaration of Principles32 there were fourteen absten-
tions. In addition, I conclude that the state practice is not suffi-
ciently widespread and the custom sufficiently strong to establish 
his point. The analogies we usually draw upon involve unanimous 
General Assembly resolutions to demonstrate opinio juris. In addi-
tion, there is, usually an insistence upon positive, affirmative action 
by the states to establish the essential element of factum, of prac-
tice, in the formation of customary international law. This type of 
action has not been taken with respect to deep seabed mining. But 
this latter, especially, is an issue of fact. I would respect Mr. Lee's 
appraisal to the contrary that the declarations of which he spoke 
and the votes taken are themselves effective. But they do not consti-
tute the essential element of factum of state practice. Where are the 
state laws and the acts and positive interactions of states, the claims 
and counterclaims, assertions and acquiescence which are as essen-
tial to the implementation of the Declarations which, in themselves, 
let me repeat, have only the quality of the opinio juris element. And 
I must add an important point. When a state seeks to change cus-
tomary international law, its implementing practice necessarily 
begins by being in breach of existing international law, and that 
unlawful practice can only become eventually legitimated by agree-
ment, deference, acquiescence or lack of timely protest-as we were 
told in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case. 33 Accordingly, it is 
clearly premature for anyone to say now, in February 1979, that the 
31. G.A.Res. 2574 D, 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.30), U.N. Doc. N7630 (1969). 
32. See note 17 supra. 
33. [1951] I.C.J. 116. 
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Moratorium Resolution and the General Assembly's Declaration of 
Principles have changed the law and reflect the current interna-
tional law of the sea. This would effectively turn the General Assem-
bly into a full-blown legislature, a capability proposed at San Fran-
cisco in 1945 and decisively rejected by the Conference. 
AMBASSADOR ALDRICH: In the same debate in the United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea last September that Roy Lee 
referred to, Elliot Richardson also made a statement to the contrary 
effect. 34 Lest there be any misunderstanding, I want to make it clear 
that it is our view that the resolution of 1970 does not have a legal 
effect. We made that clear at the time we voted for that resolution. 
The substantive meaning to be given to the phrase "the common 
heritage of mankind," remains to be given and it would have to be 
given by the law of the sea treaty. In the absence of agreement in 
the treaty, we do not think it has any meaning. I would also point 
out that in 1969 there was another resolution calling for a morato-
rium on the exploration and exploitation of seabed resources35 which 
we voted against. You have to keep that in mind in interpreting the 
1970 resolution. But I think there are a couple of other factors that 
we ought to keep in mind as we talk about the subject. For example, 
we must consider other hypothetical alternatives in addition to the 
one that Congressman McCloskey posed. We cannot exclude the 
possibility of state action against seabed mining vessels. Nor can we 
exclude the possibility that such state action would be pursuant to 
what purported to be an authorization from the United Nations 
General Assembly to take action against "pirate vessels on the high 
seas, robbing the common heritage." This is not inconceivable. 
PROF. GOLDIE: What about a General Assembly reference to the 
International Court of Justice for an Advisory Opinion? 
34. Statement by Ambassador at Large Elliot L. Richardson, Plenary, Sept. 13, 1978: 
Specific allegations have been made here concerning the incompatability of national 
legislation with United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2574 D (XXIV) and 
2749 (XXV). With respect to the former, the so-called "Moratorium Resolution," I 
would first note that, while 62 states voted in favor, the United States and 27 other 
states voted against, and 28 additional states abstained. Clearly, the resolution can-
not be said to have commanded overwhelming support. Moreover, the United States 
Representative was explicit in his explanation of his government's negative vote: 
'The prohibition which the draft resolution contains is without binding legal effect; 
that is the case with almost any General Assembly Resolution, and it is certainly the 
case for any General Assembly Resolution purporting to proscribe standards of con-
duct for States in the oceans.' 
See note 27 supra .. 
35. See notes 31 and 35 supra. 
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AMBASSADOR ALDRICH: The possibility exists that there would 
be, before this happened, a decision of the International Court of 
Justice that would take a clear position on the issues. The other 
thing that I thought was relevant that really has not been mentioned 
is that we must consider the importance of the resources in question. 
Professor Goldie referred, in general terms, to the world's potential 
needs for some of the metals. I think the key word here is potential. 
There is no question in. my mind that thirty or fifty years from today 
the world, more specifically the industrialized world, will be heavily 
dependent upon minerals from the seabeds. Particular dependence 
will be on nickel, cobalt and manganese. The seabeds will always 
be a moderate or small producer in the world's copper supply. But, 
at that time, the industrialized countries will sorely need those re-
sources. Today the need is not great. Part of the problem we face in 
arguing in the abstract the legal questions of states rights to mine 
manganese nodules, despite the opinion of the majority of voting 
members in the United Nations General Assembly, is that we lose 
focus of reality. That is, do we really need manganese nodules to 
supply our mineral needs? For example, if instead of manganese 
nodules we were talking about petroleum, I do not think we would 
be arguing the issue. Certainly, we would not be negotiating in a 
United Nations conference about the subject. Today there is the 
possibility of petroleum on the outer edges of the continental shelf, 
beyond what states claim is the 200 mile exclusive economic zone 
under the treaty. Therefore, all the states with broad continental 
margins, thinking that they might have petroleum out beyond the 
200 mile zone, are absolutely insistent in this conference that 
coastal state jurisdiction over those resources must extend as far as 
there are any resources. That is the other big unresolved issue in the 
conference in addition to seabed mining. There is no question that 
there will not be a treaty to which those states are a party if petro-
leum resources are going to be left to the tender mercies of an inter-
national seabed authority. Therefore, I suggest that the present 
state of affairs is a negotiation about a potentially very valuable 
resource in the future. Now, our need for the resource is not an 
immediate, pressing one, and that naturally will be seen as reducing 
to some extent the force of our argument. But viewing the law as 
dynamic as well as relating to the facts and the perceived needs of 
the time, I think that in the future when this issue reappears it may 
also look very different from a legal point of view. 
MR. HULL: I think that it is quite clear that although we are 
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talking about deep seabed mining, and about the manganese, cop-
per, cobalt and nickel that is contained in these nodules, we are also 
talking about a good deal more, as Congressman McCloskey's hypo-
thetical so clearly pointed out. 
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